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Introduction 
The current pattern of competition of the Brazilian's telecommunication 
market was defined by a regulatory reform implemented in the second half of the 
nineties. Before that, there were only a state holding company  Telebras , which 
controlled 23 state operators, and a long distance carrier  Embratel. (Section 1) 
each one with a monopoly in their respective markets. 
The demands for more competition in the Brazilian telecommunications 
market started to make echoes around the early 90s, following the same 
"liberalization and deregulation rhetoric observed worldwide. The 
telecommunications' regulatory reform, discussed in Section 2, promoted the 
privatization of Telebras System and fostered competition in the Brazilian market.  
The privatized operators have achieved remarkable results under a duopoly 
system stricted supervised by Anatel  the new regulatory agency created by the 
1997s General Law of Telecommunications (Section 3). The called LGT defined 
the regulatory framework of the new system. 
Notwithstanding, the regulatory Brazilian scheme is now at a crossroads. 
From 2002, an open market approach will be implemented in telecom arena. In 
Section 4, we will discuss the possible changes in the pattern of competition in 
those markets and discuss changes, from the firms strategy perspective, and also 
the main influences coming from the international scenario under the World Trade 
Organization system.  
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1.  Background  
Following the same pattern of most of the countries, until 1997 the State 
supplied and legally monopolized all telecommunications services in Brazil. That 
situation only contrasted with the United States' experience, where ATT had never 
been publicly owned or assured a legal monopoly. 
In 1996, the Telebras System (a state holding company1) was the largest 
telecommunications company in Latin America. 28 operators were under its 
umbrella, with 88,000 employees.2 Along the years, Telebras utilized a self-
financing approach (the candidate user had to buy companies shares in order to 
apply for a telephone line), combined with resources coming from National Fund 
of Telecommunications (FNT). That fund also supported the establishment of 
Embratel, in 1965, which came to explore long distance telecom services in Brazil. 
The process of technology acquisition, adaptation and improvement by 
Telebras and Embratel evolved to a process of  increasing local content and even 
technological developments along the eighties. Meanwhile, the System faced 
increasing bottlenecks to finance the huge investments necessary to their 
expansion. Macroeconomic reasons (massive government deficits), combined with 
microeconomic ones (low tariffs, the limitations of self-financing) explained the 
increasing limits to the Systems growth. 
                                                                
1 The Brazilian government controlled 5O.O4% of common shares and 21.45% of total capital at the end of 
1996.  4O% of total preferred shares were held by international shareholders.  
2 Only four operators did not belong to the holding: CRT, Sercomtel, Ceterp. and CTBC.   
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When tariffs were concerned, the self-financing scheme had perverse 
effects on consumers. The high price paid to apply to the telephony service was a 
strong barrier to entry to poor people. Even when the self-financing was abolished, 
the candidate to a telephone line had to pay more than US$1.000 (converted in 
shares of Telebras subsidiaries) and to wait until two years to have his terminal 
installed! 
As far as local service was subsidized (in the form of low tariffs) by long 
distance calls and data communication, the elite3 that accessed the services had a 
double privilege. From one size, they could protect their investments by 
negotiating the acquired shares in the stock market at higher prices. From the other 
size, they could get low prices by the use of the telecom services in Brazil. 
The tariffs were also an element of dispute between local operators and 
Embratel, which operate long distance calls and data communications. As far as 
the last had the monopoly of the most profitable services, the embattles by shared 
revenues and services were constant.   
The demands for more competition in the Brazilian telecommunications 
market, however, started only in the 90s. In 1997, the unsatisfied demand by 
telephones was estimated in 25 million terminals, in contrast with the 14.7 million 
access lines in service. The teledensity in Brazil in the same year (9.1) was below 
Argentina (21.9 and 17.9), Chile (15.4) and Mexico (9.7). 
                                                                
3 In mid 90s, 98% of the Telebras subscribers had a monthly income of more than US$ 1.000.  At that 
moment, the minimum wage in Brazil was below US$100.  
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2. The Telecommunication Reform: 1995 to 1998 
In the administration of Mr. Sergio Motta, head of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Communications from 1995 to 1998, the issues of Telebras System's privatization 
and the liberalization of the market were formally introduced. That position came 
in the focus of a wider liberal reform promoted by the government of Brazil under 
Mr. Cardoso platform. 
The main goals were services universalization and competition between 
operators. The chosen formula was to privatize the telecom operators, keeping the 
government control on telecom services through regulation. Meanwhile, neither 
the financial resources nor the legislation were available at that moment. 
Between 1995 and 1997, the major laws concerning Brazilians 
privatization and liberalization of the telecommunications market came into effect: 
1) The Constitutional Amendment (8/1995) authorized the break of Telebras 
monopoly; 
2) The Minimum Telecommunications Law (7/96) started the flexibilization of 
the model, opening to the private sector new concessions of mobile services, 
satellite services, data communications and value-added services 
3)  The General Telecommunications Law (7/97) was the masterpiece to the 
reform, defining the guidelines of an autonomous, original and open regulation 
to the sector. The  fundamental principles established  by the LGT were: 
1) The organization of telecommunications services according to two 
basic principles (universalization and competition); 
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2) The privatization of the federal companies (those ones under Telebras 
umbrella and Embratel). 
3) The reorganization of telecommunications services market according to 
two basic principles (universalization and competition); 
4) The creation of the regulatory agency (National Agency of 
Telecommunications, Anatel). 
Regulatory authority has shifted in fundamental ways. Responsibility for 
the implementation of setorial policies, services and networks regulamentation 
and inspection were taken from the Ministry of Communications to Anatel (Table 
1). Issuance of authorizations for services in the public regime (subordinated to 
universalization and continuity principles, tariff control and so on) and 
authorizations for services in the private regime, monitoring of radiofrequencys 
spectrum and space, control of economic infractions were among the main roles of 
Anatel as well.   
Table 1: 
Telecommunications' Regulatory Reform in Brazil - 1997 
         Before Reform                                  After Reform 
Policy 
Formulation Ministry of Communications           Executive & Legislative 
Regulator    Ministry of Communications/Telebras  Anatel 
Operator    Telebras, Embratel                             Private operators 
Owner    Government, shareholders               Private shareholders         
Source: Anatel (2000) 
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A general restructuring plan was implemented before the privatization of 
the Telebras System, as far as the idea of a mere change to a private monopoly 
was not acceptable: 
1) Huge investments in modernization of the Telebras System were 
implemented, between 1995 and 1997 (US$ 20 billion), through 
digitalization of the services, tariffs rebalance, and so on; 
2) The state operators were spliced in two business units: one for fix 
telephony and other for mobiles; 
3) The fixed  telephony units passed to the umbrella of three regional fixed 
telephony holdings (responsible for local and intra-regional long 
distance services) and one long distance international and inter-regional 
company (see Figure 1); 
4) The mobile units were combined in eight holding companies to provide 
services under the called A band (see Figure 2). 
The Brazilian model was unique when comparable to other Latin Americas 
experiences. The three-region approach targeted the integration of Brazils North 
and Midwest according to the governments regional development policies. The 
creation of a competitive environment was driven to foment opportunities to 
attract investments and develop technology.  Finally, the goal was to maximize the 
sale value of the telecommunications companies subject to the achievement of 
previous objectives. The profile of the Regional Fixed Line Holding Companies 
soon before their privatization is showed below. 
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Figure 1: 
Brazil: Regional Markets for Fix Telephone Operators, 1998 
  *Local and intra-regional 
  ** Long distance  
Figure 2: 
Brazil: Mobile Market, A Band and B Band 1998 
  Source: Anatel 
Region I* 
Region II*
Region III* 
Region 
IV**
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Table 2: 
BRAZIL - Operational and Economic Profile of the New Telecom              
Holding Companies before Privatization (1997) 
 TELESP TELEST TELESUL* 
Lines in Service 
-rank in LA 
5,704,239 
3 
5,642,452 
2 
2,742,713*** 
6*** 
Employees** 24,162 37,106 19,724 
Access Lines in Service 
Penetration 
14,7% 6.5% 7.2% 
% of Brazils GDP 36% 39% 25% 
1995 GDP per capita US$6,411 US$2,740 US$4,086 
% of Brazils popul. 22% 54% 24% 
% of Pop. Growth (91/96) 1.6% 1.2% 3.6% 
*Does not include CRT          **includes cellular    ***if  CRT is included, access lines in 
service would total 3,694,939 and the company would rank 4th in Latin America. 
Source: Restructuring and Privatization of the Telebras System: Overview of the 
Implementation Program (1997). 
Meanwhile, as far as Sao Paulo  the richest state of Brazil  was defined as 
a single area, the model had a bias in terms of economic and demographic density. 
In fact, one of the main proposals of the privatization was to attract major 
international telecom companies to the Brazilian market, through the perspective 
of the huge growth of the local market and the absence of restrictions to the 
participation of the foreign capital in the acquisition of those companies.  
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 In the beginning of 1997, the mobile market was open to private 
investments through the B band bid. Ten regions were defined in order that the 
new operators could compete with the established ones (A Band). As a result, 
the Brazilian government earned more than US$ 8 billion with the auction (see 
Table 3), more than two times the defined minimum price.  
Table 3 
Brazil: Final Result of the Mobile Telephony Auction, 1997 (B Band) 
     - US$ Million - 
Area Consortium  Minimum 
Price(A) 
Paid Price (B) B/A (%) 
1 BCP 600 2,646 341.25 
2 TESS 600 1,326 121.16 
3 ATL 500 1,508 201.28 
4 MAXITEL 400 0,520 30.0 
5 Global Telecom 330 737 134.52 
6 TELET 330 334 1.36 
7 AMERICEL 270 338 25.37 
8 NORTE BRASIL TEL. - 60 - 
9 MAXITEL 230 250 8,69 
10 BSE 230 555 141,55 
TOTAL  3,700 8,274 123,65 
Source: Anatel Site  
In October 1997, the National Agency of Telecommunications  Anatel  
was created. After that, the next step of telecoms reform in Brazil was the 
privatization of the Telebras System. In order to achieve its mission, Anatel 
implemented some basic instruments to deal with the fixed telephone system: 
1) General Plan of Outorgs (PGO) 
1.1 According to the PGO, only the fixed telephone system would be 
explored under a public regime (or even under a public/private one); all 
others services were under a private regime; 
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1.2 An initial duopoly structure would be established em four areas (three 
licenses for local services and one national long distance services); 
1.3 In each area, a mirror company would be created to compete with the 
incumbent ones to be privatized; 
1.4 All new licenses would be auctioned: weighted score combining price 
with coverage and expansion targets would select winners. 
2) General Plan of Universalization Goals (PGMU) 
Only the incumbent firms must achieve the goals of the PGMU. Under 
the Plan, the target number of fixed terminals, at the end of 2001, should be 
33 million, two times the 1997s figure. The Plan also target to increase the 
availability of local services according to the size of the cities and the 
teledensity of public phones per state and at country level (around 1 million 
at the end of 2001). 
3) General Plan of Quality Goals (PGMQ) 
Accordingly, this Plan defined the performance indicators related to 
better technical and operational standards to be achieved by the incumbent 
operators along the time.  
Those instruments were essential steps prior to the privatization and also to 
the long-term environment of free competition planned to be implemented after 
2001. The concession contracts established by the Agency with the incumbent 
operators  who define rights and obligations of the telecom companies  includes 
all parameters and indicators from the PGMU and PGMQ.  
Along the transition period prior to 2001, several restrictions were defined 
as well. Each operator  the incumbent firm and its respective mirror company 
would be restricted to their regional and service market until they achieved their 
universalization and service qualitys targets. In order to foment increasing 
competition, as well, each controller could only own shares of one single operator, 
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in each services category (for example one fixed line operator and one mobile 
operator). 
In order to compete in new telecom markets in Brazil, from 2001 on, the 
operators must anticipate the 2003s targets (including PGMU and PGMQ ones) 
established in their concession contracts. Wisely, the regulatory agency defined 
the carrot which has motivated the operators to fulfill their universal services 
and quality obligations until the end of 2001. 
Table 4: 
Brazil: Privatization Auction of Telebras System, 1998 
(US$ Million) 
Company Consortium Minimum 
Price (A) 
Paid 
Price (B) 
B/A (%) 
Telesp 
Participacoes (fix) 
Telefonica de Espanha, Portugal 
Telecom, Iberdrola,               
Banco Bilbao y Viscaya 
 
3,520 
 
5,783 
 
64.29 
Tele Norte Leste 
Participacoes (fix) 
Andrade Gutierrez, Inepar, Funcef, 
A.D.Leite e Alianca da Bahia 3,400 3,434 1.00 
Tele Centro Sul 
Participacoes (fix) 
Telecom Italia, Opportunity 1,950 2,070 6.15 
Embratel 
Participacoes (fix) 
MCI 1,800 2,650 47.22 
Telesp Celular 
Participacoes  
Portugal Telecom 1,100 3,558 226.18 
Tele Sudeste Celular 
Participacoes 
Telefonica de Espana, Iberdrola, 
Itochu and NTT 570 1,360 138.6 
Telemig Celular 
Participacoes 
Telesystem,  Pension Funds and 
Opportunity 230 756 228.70 
Tele Celular Sul 
Participacoes 
Globo, Bradesco and  
Telecom Italia 
230 700 204.00 
Tele Nordeste Celular 
Participacoes 
Pension Funds, Opportunity and 
Telesystem 225 660 193.30 
Tele Centro-Oeste 
Celular Participacoes 
Grupo Beldi (Splice)  230 440 91.30 
Tele Leste Celular 
Participacoes 
Telefonica de Espana, Iberdrola 125 428,8 242.20 
Tele Norte  Celular 
Participacoes 
Pension Funds, Opportunity  
and Telesystem 90 188 108.90 
TOTAL  13.470 22,042 63.74 
Source: Anatel site 
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Once the Government, with the support of several consultancy firms, 
developed the desired structure of the new telecom market in Brazil, step by step, 
the basic conditions to the privatization process were achieved. The auction of the 
former state companies occurred in July 1998, and their main results are showed in 
Table 4. 
In the first half of 1999, the definition of the mirror companies that would 
start to compete with the privatized incumbents was completed. Four new private 
operators entered in the Brazilian telecom market (see Table 5), and later some 
local auctions have been realized by the regulator to define smaller operators into 
specific niche markets (those companies were named little mirrors). 
Table 5: 
Brazil: Main Characteristics of Telecom Mirror Companies  
-Fix Market- 
Region Name of the Company 
/Year  Start  operation 
Controller Technology/market 
I Vesper S.A./2000 
Velocom (bought % of Bell 
Canada );  Qualcomm 
WLL/ local, intra-regional 
II Global Village (GVT)/2001  Local, intra-regional 
III Vesper S.P./2000 
Velocom (bought % of Bell 
Canada);  Qualcomm WLL/ local, intra-regional 
IV Intelig/2000 National Grid, France Telecom, Sprint Local, intra-regional 
Source: several sources 
As we can see, the mirror companies are quite young and, together, they 
only control less than 7% of the number of fixed lines in the Brazilian telecom 
market.4 The local market is still almost monopolized by incumbent firms. The 
market where stronger competition was reached until the moment is the intra-
regional long distance calls, once until four companies are competing there (local 
operator, Embratel and their mirrors). 
                                                                
4 In mid-2001 the three mirrors represent around 3 million terminals from a total of 43.3 million fix access 
lines intalled in Brazil. 
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3. Recent Developments in the Brazilian Telecommunications Market 
The digital economy represents today 10% of the Brazilian GDP. 
Together, the 200 largest private companies in the field of 
information/communications in Brazil had total sales of US$ 55 billion in the year 
2000. 
The largest revenues came from telecom companies (US$ 30.6 Billion). 
Among the twelve firms that got sales beyond one billion dollars in that year, 
seven came from telecommunications market.   Telemar  the only incumbent that 
is controlled by Brazilian shareholders  was the leader with US$5.5 billion sales 
(see Table 6).    The number of direct jobs by the telecom service operators 
reached more than 300.000 people in 2000, and the direct investments by those 
companies in the Brazilian market achieve US$ 7 billion dollars.5        
Table 6 
Brazil: The Top Ten Telecommunications Firms in 2000 
Company Sales A 
(US$M.)  
Profits  B 
(US$M.) 
Margin % 
B/A 
Employees Controller 
Origin 
Telemar (f) 5,551 363 6.54 39,297 Brazilian 
Telefonica (f) 5,025 752 14.97 56,151 Spanish 
Embratel (f) 4,581 295 6.44 12,000 American 
Brasil Telecom (f) 3,093 210 6.78 23,642 Italian 
Telesp Cel.  (m) 1,884 78 4.13 4,336 Portuguese 
Motorola (e) 1,504 N/A N/A 3,100 American 
Tele SE Cel. (m) 1,014 N/A N/A 1,326 Spanish 
Nokia (m) 941 N/A N/A 1,260 Finland 
BCP (m) 853 -182 -21.34 1,908 Brazilian 
Tele CO Cel (m) 578 66 11.45 2,397 Brazilian 
f= fix operator  m= mobile operator  e= equipment maker 
Source: Info Exame  2001 
 
                                                                
5 The investments in communications in Brazil represented 24% of the total foreign investment until June 
2001 (estimated in US$ 9,345 Billion ), followed by financial transactions (16.21%) and chemical industry 
(9.13%)  
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The four original incumbents (coming from the fix telephony market) 
represent 60% of the total sales of the sector (or US$ 18 billion). Three mobile 
incumbents are also among the largest firms (with sales of US$ 3,5 billion). The 
only new comer in the list (operating in the B Band) shows huge losses in that 
period. If we combine the losses of the three mobile operators, which operate in 
B Band in Rio-Sao Paulo ax (the largest markets in Brazil), they will achieve 
US$ 500 million in 2000. 
The growth of the Brazilian telecommunications market has been quite fast 
after the privatization. As far as Brazil is the largest Latin-American country, in 
terms of population and size of the economy, the stock of fixed and mobile 
followed those trends in recent years.6 In 1999, Brazil showed a leader position in 
terms of the advances of fixed terminals worldwide (with a 25% growth compared 
with the previous year). 
 The number of fix access lines installed in Brazil increased more than three 
times between 1994 and 2001 (see Figure 3), reaching 43.3 million in mid-2001.7 
Telefonica  the incumbent that operates in Sao Paulo (the largest market in 
Brazil) - is responsible for 12.5 million lines only in that state.  
The increase of the mobile market was already faster (see Figure 4). The 
number of cellular terminals reached 26 million in mid-2001. In the year 2000, the 
mobiles growth rate was above 50%, following the market boom between 
1995/99, when the number of mobiles almost double each year in Brazil.  
An important characteristic of the Brazilian telecom growth in recent years 
was the deeper penetration of the telecom services among poor people. Until 1994, 
more than 80% of the fix telephones belonged to the rich and middle class in 
Brazil. 
                                                                
6 Brazil represents around 38% of the Regions GDP, and controls 37% of the fix access lines and 40% of 
mobiles. In contrast, Argentina shows a smaller proportion in both telecom indicators, and Mexico follows 
the trend with the mobile market. Data quoted by Wohlers, Marcio (2001). 
7 In 1994, Brazil had only 13.3 million fix telephone terminals already installed. 
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Figure 3 
Brazil : Evolution of the Fix Telephone Lines in Operation  1995/2001 
Figure 4: 
Brazil:  Evolution of Cellular Mobile Services, 1995/2001 
 Note: 2001 (2nd sem), 2003 and 2005, forecast 
Source: Anatel 
-Millions- 
-Millions- 
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 Today, one quarter of the poorer families had a telephone set (see Figure 
5). The public telephones along those years growed three times, reaching more 
than 1.000.000 terminals in mid-2001. The wide spread of mobiles among the 
poor in Brazil is quite explained by the huge growth of pre-paid cellular services 
(that represents 59% of the handsets in operation today in the country). 
It is important to remember that corporative services (classified among 
private services), and particularly data communications services, are offered in an 
environment of strong competition in Brazil. Anatel gave more than 200 licenses 
to those operators, but most of the licensed companies are still providing services 
for their own use. Two to three dozen firms are concentrated in large cities and 
even in rich neighborhoods providing specialized services.  
Meanwhile, some companies are reaching a strong growth in that area. 
AT&T Latin America` revenues increased 1,218%, from US$2.5 million, in 1999, 
to US$ 33 million in 2000. The company operates not only in Brazil, but also in 
Argentina, Peru, Chile and Colombia. It offers broadband services (including last 
mile) to corporative clients.8 
The large incumbents  like Telemar, Embratel and Telefonica are also 
doing huge investments in this profitable market (like IP network), and promoting 
the capilarization of those services in their respective areas of concession. Even 
mirror companies like Vesper are diversifying its operations towards corporative 
users.   
                                                                
8 The firm has more than 1,000 corporative users among very large corporations operating in Brazil  like 
GM, AOL, Acer and Souza Cruz. Another target is its participation in the Brazilian Payment System 
(SPB), which will establish a real time link among all banks, including Bovespa stock market. 
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Figure 5: 
Brazil : Homes with Telephone According to Personal Income 
Region I: 
Region II: 
Region III: 
  Note: 2001, forecast 
  Source: Anatel  
